Governance in International Development:

A Survey and Recommendations for the Social Sector

Draft Initially Prepared by Sangamitra Ramachander

I. Introduction: An Overview of Governance

A review of the literature on "governance" finds that there are a multitude of understandings of the term, depending on the level of analysis, such as global versus local, and the unit to which the term is applied, whether nation, network, sector or enterprise. A large part of the existing literature is in the area of "public sector" governance. Even within this sphere, however, there isn't a single universally accepted definition of the term. Kauffmann and Kraay (2008) note nevertheless that "the degree of definitional disagreement can easily be overstated" and that nearly all definitions are common in that they emphasize "the importance of a capable state, accountable to its citizens and operating under the rule of law". More generally, the core principles of capability and accountability find mention in nearly all discussions on governance, regardless of the level or unit of analysis.

A. Governance in International Development

In the context of international development, the interest in "governance" rose significantly in the early 1990s, following the publication of the World Bank "Governance and Development" report in 1992, where the concept was emphasized as central to the success of its development efforts. The report explains:

> Good governance, for the World Bank, is synonymous with sound development management. The Bank's experience has shown that the programs and projects it helps finance may be technically sound, but fail to deliver anticipated results for reasons connected to the quality of government action. Legal reforms, however urgent, may come to naught if the new laws are not enforced consistently or there are severe delays in implementation. Efforts to develop privatized production and encourage market-led growth may not succeed unless investors face clear rules and institutions that reduce uncertainty about future government action. Vital reforms of public expenditure may flounder if accounting systems are so weak that budgetary policies cannot be implemented or monitored or if poor procurement systems encourage corruption and distort public investment priorities. Failure to involve beneficiaries and others affected in the design and implementation of projects can substantially erode their sustainability.

Clearly, the term, as defined above, encompasses the idea of “capability” – the quality of (government) action, implementation or enforcement – and “accountability” – clear and certain rules and systems of accounting and monitoring. A further area emphasized by the World Bank definition of “good governance” is the involvement of beneficiaries in project design. Indeed these three concepts resonate closely with the interpretation of governance by the Department of International Development (DFID), UK’s bilateral aid agency, in terms of three constituent elements – Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness (CAR).

Nearly two decades on, with the growing role of “social sector” organizations as actors in development, the present review reflects on the governance issues that warrant attention within the social sector and how these might be similar or distinct from aspects of governance researched within the “public sector” in the past. In doing so, the study first attempts to define the social sector space, which includes a wide range of organizations, often of a hybrid form, which use innovative entrepreneurial and market-based approaches to solve problems of development. This sector is sometimes also referred to as a “third sector”, which has emerged to address the twin failures of the government and the market. Given the inherent heterogeneity of organizations within the social sector, however, universal definitions and frameworks for analysis are not easy to identify or generate. Nevertheless, this study marks a beginning by surveying the existing literature on governance as it applies to the social sector and raising some of the important areas that need to be addressed in research and practice.

II. Governance in the Social Sector

Governance in the “social sector" has traditionally largely been studied with reference to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Yet organizations that are so designated are highly diverse in size, structure and funding sources. NGOs include large international NGOs (INGOs) and small grassroots organizations working to respond to specific unmet needs in local communities. Clearly governance structures will vary considerably between them. Additionally, over the last two decades, entrepreneurial, market-based approaches to address fundamental problems of development have emerged, and many of these emphasize both financial and social returns.

A. The Emergence of Social Enterprises

"Social enterprises" are organizations that strive to create social impact in a commercially sustainable manner. In doing so, these organizations resemble not only "not-for-profit organizations"[1] but also private sector corporations that aim to maximize value for shareholders. Social enterprises therefore pursue a double bottom line, with a third bottom line occasionally being considered for environmental impact (Spear et al., 2009). These organizations are often conflated with the larger non-profit space since many charities among non-profits have set up trading arms and that provide goods and services for financial reward. Increasingly, however, the trading businesses are being incorporated as separate companies to accommodate the differing objectives of the charity and the retail arm, resulting in the emergence of a distinct category of organizations that do social-good profitably (Low, 2006).

There is increasing promise attached to social enterprises within the development field, particularly as a means to deliver services to low-income, rural or marginalized communities. Ignatio (2012) argues that donors and multilateral agencies are tending to favor private sector development as a preferred path to growth since the "promotion of a stable macroeconomic environment and trade liberalization by themselves may not trigger supply-side responses, and that heavy-handed government action through public enterprises and industrial policies are prone to political capture and often result in a checkerboard of local monopolies. There is therefore much interest in policies that make it easier to do business, remove obstacles to external enterprise financing, and develop a pool of skills that can be readily harnessed by a growing entrepreneurial class." He further argues that the rise in social enterprises in particular is the result of the confluence of three trends: the urgent need for new ideas to solve old problems of development, novel approaches made possible by technological innovation, and the rise in global prosperity and integration.

B. Social Enterprises' Range

The interest surrounding social enterprises is arguably similar to the excitement over microfinance over the past decade or more. However, microfinance organizations

[1] There are three types of nonprofit organizations that find mention in the literature: corporation-sponsored philanthropic organizations, service organizations, and advocacy groups.

(MFIs) represent only one form of social enterprise and many of the failings associated with MFIs – inflexible and narrow product range, prohibitive pricing and a tenuous link between microcredit and microenterprise – would not necessarily apply to other social enterprises.[2] Indeed the term "social enterprise" is "open-ended" and these organizations represent a range of business models that can be adapted to efficiently serve the poor (Ignatio, 2012).

The wide variety of firms that fall under this category, however, also makes it harder to develop meaningful generalizations for the sector. In the UK, for example, co-operatives, community businesses, credit unions, development trusts, trading charities, housing associations and social firms all fall within the ambit of social enterprises (Spear et al.,2009). Spear et al. (2009) frame an interesting typology for the study of social enterprises based on their "origins and development path". They suggest that "social enterprises can usefully be divided into four main types: mutuals (e.g. co-operatives and credit unions), trading charities (e.g. enterprises set up by charities to develop revenue), public sector spin-offs (e.g. enterprises formed to undertake some services previously delivered by public authorities) and new-start social enterprises (e.g. new businesses started from scratch by a social entrepreneur)" .

Research that examines governance differences and similarities within the organizations in the social sector is in its infancy. This review will begin with a focus on "NGO governance", where the majority of social sector governance research is concentrated, and proceed to the more recent study of governance in the specific area of "social enterprises".

III. Governance and NGOs

In order to provide a working definition of what we mean by governance, we use the three basic constituents of the concept – Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness (CAR) – developed by DFID. The CAR framework is useful in that it brings to the fore the "demand side" of governance – the needs of the intended beneficiaries and firms – rather than focusing on the internal functioning of service providers (the "supply side") alone.

---

[2] Microfinance institutions are among the most well known in the category of social enterprise, and while a number have evolved to become publicly listed companies, most of these, as with the majority of social enterprises, remain income-generating non-profits that reinvest their revenues in growing their social mission.

A. Capability

The CAR framework of DFID defines capability as "the ability and authority of leaders, governments and public organizations to implement policies and programmes." With the growing role of NGOs as powerful voices in civil society and providers of "public goods", an assessment of the capability of these organizations is an area that has received increasing attention in academic research and the media. Besley and Ghatak (2007) point out three reasons for the emerging role of NGOs in developing countries: mounting government failure in the provision of public goods, efficient alternatives to direct provision by the government, and the growing acknowledgement that there exists a large space between the market and the government for a "third sector". They assert that voluntary non-profit organisations (often referred to as NGOs in the context of developing countries) fill the "vacuum created by the twin problems of government and market failure." Along similar lines, Rose-Ackerman (1986) proposes that the rise of the non-profit sector is a response to government failure and to information asymmetries and transaction costs in the for-profit sector.

In addition to demand-side explanations, the supply side factors cited in the literature are "based on the critical roles that civil society leaders, activists, and policy entrepreneurs play, not just in educating the public about social and political issues, but also in actively establishing organizational frameworks under which new services can be performed" (Hansmann, 1987). Another important factor is government support, in the form of implicit and explicit subsidies, including tax exemptions.

The literature nevertheless also questions the limits to the powers and roles of "civil society". Johns (2000) argues, for example, that NGOs should not assert themselves as "a new form of democratic legitimacy or the greatest expression of democracy", as this would make them more likely to come under regulation, and that they should "claim no more than to represent a view". Grant and Keohane (2005) note that NGOs often tend to fall under public criticism as they "boast more legitimacy and a broader rule than the facts would justify". Charnovitz (2005) cites Anderson (2001) as among the sharpest critics in this regard, who posits with regard to international NGOs that "their hubris exceeds their accountability".

B. Accountability

Accountability in the CAR framework has been defined as “the ways in which citizens hold leaders, governments and public organizations to account, through elections, political parties and civil society organizations.” This section highlights why accountability is particularly important in the case of NGOs, identifies the stakeholders to whom NGOs are accountable, and points out possible mechanisms of enforcement for the sector.

Moore and Stewart (1998) highlight the importance of accountability by noting that organizations that (a) use public money and/or (b) are intended to influence public business have to be held publicly accountable to comply with good governance standards. Eisenberg (2002) asserts along more critical lines that the growing economic and social status of NGOs has resulted in a self-righteous attitude within these organizations, and greater accountability is therefore needed. Salamon (1995) similarly refers to the “myth of pure virtue”, which has made civil society fall under increasing public scrutiny.

1. NGOs in the Power Structure

The need to hold NGOs accountable has also received attention in the media. According to an article in the New York Times (2003), “nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, are now part of the power structure, too. They receive donations from the public and advocate policies that each group claims are in the public interest. As they become part of the established political landscape worldwide, these groups owe it to the public to be accountable and transparent themselves.” Similarly, an article in The Economist (2003) has proposed the “novel idea” of “auditing NGOs” , as a means to answer the question that is the title of the piece: “Who Guards the Guardians?”

2. Principles of Accountability

The One World Trust in its Global Accountability Framework refers to four good practice principles of accountability to assess all types of global actors from intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and the corporate sector. These are transparency, participation, evaluation and complaints and responses. Transparency is defined as the “the provision of accessible and timely information to stakeholders and the opening up of organizational processes to their assessment” while participation has been defined as “the process through which an organization enables key stakeholders to play an active role in the decisions and activities, which affect them." Evaluation encompasses "the process through which an organization monitors and reviews its progress against goals and objectives; feeds learning from this back into the organization, and reports on the progress" and complaints and responses refers to "mechanisms through which an organization enables stakeholders to make complaints against its decisions and actions, and ensures these are properly reviewed and acted upon".

3. Theoretical Models of Accountability

   Grant and Keohane (2005) identify two "theoretical models" or "basic concepts" of accountability — delegation and participation. In the delegation model, the accountability holders are those who entrust or authorize power. In the participation model, the accountability holders are those affected by the actions of the power-wielders. In both the delegation and participation models of accountability, it is apparent that NGOs owe duty of care to both "their constituencies and to process" and are accountable internally as well as externally (Spiro, 2002). Spiro (2002) explains that while internal accountability is subject to practical constraints such as membership, external accountability to "the system" is suboptimal because NGOs lack the required incentives to be accountable.

4. Accountability to Stakeholders

   Wapner (2002) summarizes the various stakeholders to which NGOs are accountable: (i) Members and donors, who can voice dissent through exit and pocketbook; (ii) Directors on the Board; (iii) Other NGOs through NGO associations, and (iv) Governments who provide accreditations. Addressing the question of how such accountability can be implemented, Spar and Dail (2002) propose a central product classification (typology) of NGO functions "simply to provide some descriptive basis for analysis, some way of defining what a particular NGO does before attempting to assess how well it has done." If, for example, an NGO is in the health sector, it should be possible to evaluate its performance along some common, health-related denominators, and to compare it, even at a very basic level, to other similarly positioned groups.

5. Results-oriented model

Fowler (1995) proposes one such framework to assess NGO performance by focusing on the outputs, outcomes and impact of their activities. Output is a fairly straightforward quantitative measure of the interventions taken to address a problem (low-income homes built, vaccinations administered). Outcome links output to tangible effects on the beneficiaries (safer living conditions for the poor, fewer infants falling ill). Impact, however, might be more difficult to measure as it often strives to capture the long-term behavioral changes from the organization's activities – greater social and economic security, improvements in overall health awareness in community – and causality might be more difficult to establish.

C. Challenges to Enforcing Accountability

Edwards (2000), however, notes the challenges to enforcing accountability in practice: "NGO accountability is weak and problematic, since there is no clear 'bottom line' for results and no single authority to which NGOs must report on their activities." He argues that some governments – especially those with an authoritarian streak – are threatened by the perception of weak or absent accountability of NGOs and this often is used as a case for greater control over their activities.

Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2004) similarly note that the evaluation of NGOs is greatly complicated by the way they are set-up and operate. First, since NGOs do not typically charge the full cost of the service being provided, the demand from beneficiaries cannot be used as an indicator of the value of the services consumed. Second, it is in the interest of NGOs to overstate the importance of the service being provided in order to better the chances of future donor funding. As a result, the authors argue that "NGOs must be monitored by granting agencies or a third party to ensure that what they report is accurate".

Moore and Stewart (1998) point out that collective and individual self- regulation among NGOs could prove a more progressive solution to this problem. In the case of large, well-established NGOs, corporate governance norms, which institutionalize tensions between the internal management and the Board, representing both internal and external stakeholders, might be appropriate. For smaller NGOs, however, membership in NGO associations could be an effective governance mechanism as it encourages collective self-regulation. As the authors point out, "If the professional NGO association does its job and only gives and renews membership to those NGOs that observe the self-regulation norms appropriate to them, the regulation function becomes quasi-automatic."

An interesting trend in this regard has been the establishment of NGOs to monitor other NGOs. For example in 2003, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I) was launched to help monitor the actions of those engaged in humanitarian activities. The HAP-I promotes and assists self-monitoring by member organizations, which include well-known organizations such as CARE International and the Danish Refugee Council.

The concepts of "participation" and "responsiveness", which are the other aspects of accountability, are areas that have started to receive greater attention only more recently.

D. Responsiveness

Responsiveness in the CAR framework is the manner in which "leaders, governments, and public organizations should respond to the needs and rights of citizens over the use of revenues, expenditure priorities and the delivery of services". An excellent example of this participatory approach to serving beneficiaries is presented in the case study by Linklaters on the NGO Camfed (an acronym for the Campaign for Female Education), an international organization dedicated to eradicating poverty in rural Africa through the education of girls and the empowerment of young women. As the authors note, the report is "neither an audit nor a due diligence exercise but a thought piece where governance issues at the heart of the international aid sector are studied through the lens of girls' education". Therefore, many highlights from the report will resonate with international NGOs looking to build a consistent and sustainable governance model.

1. Paramount Principle-centric Models

   The "paramount principle" of the Camfed governance model is protection of the beneficiary. It translates into, "ensuring that all processes and structures of that program or initiative are designed for the protection and the benefit of that person and are effective in providing that protection and the designated benefits." In addition to the paramount principle are "organizing principles", which include transparency and accountability, partnerships with existing community structures, activism and social capital in place of dependency and a holistic and long-term approach to the delivery of both resource and protection to achieve a long-term outcome. Camfed adopts "a wholly uncompromising attitude to the implementation of each of the principles" as the principles are inherently interrelated and any slackening will cause the model to break down.

The model that Camfed has institutionalized has evolved over 20 years and is still considered a work in progress. It incorporates multiple elements of the eco-system – parents, school teachers, community members, alumni – surrounding the "vulnerable and disempowered client". Their interdependence is captured in the following example from the report: "For instance, if the local communities were not held accountable to the girl and were not afforded transparency, they might not be willing to devote their time and energy to the education of children without pay or to report misconduct and abuse, and, consequently, might not take ownership of the wider problems their communities face. In this way, the systemic change that the Camfed governance model is designed to effect would be thwarted."

2. Community Monitoring Based Models

An example of recent research that explores the effectiveness of community-monitoring in comparison to "centrally mandated approaches" is the study of schools in Uganda by Barr et al. (2011). The experiment involved the use of scorecards to monitor school performance. For one set of schools, these score cards were developed in-house by School Management Committees (SMCs) – the organizations that allow parents, teachers and other community members to express their opinion about school performance - and for another set of schools, the scorecards were designed by central organizations including NGOs and education authorities. The study found that monitoring using community-designed scorecards made students and teachers "significantly less likely to be absent from the classroom", which was accompanied by an increase in children's literacy and numeracy test scores. It is also pertinent to note here that the "criteria emphasized by SMCs for inclusion in scorecards were substantially different from those decided upon centrally". For example, the SMC-designed scorecards did not pay much attention to teacher absence, although underlying issues such as staff housing were frequently monitored.

Such recent research suggests, therefore, that there is a strong rationale for the involvement of beneficiaries in monitoring the performance of programmes, in addition to providing inputs into the design of the programme itself, as emphasized in early definitions of 'good governance'.

E. Summary

The above review of studies in the broad areas of Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness, as they relate to NGOs, does not claim to be comprehensive, but provides an indication of the major areas of focus in research thus far.

The next section will review the areas of governance that have been researched for social enterprises in particular.

IV. Governance in Social Enterprises

Given the inherently hybrid nature of social enterprises, the governance of these organizations – and the research in this field - would warrant an independent approach from that used for-profit and non-profit organizations.

Research on governance reform in the private sector has focused on the issue of conflict of interest between the shareholders and the management within the principal-agent framework (Spear et al., 2007). The emphasis has been on the role that financial incentives, monitoring and reporting, and an active market for corporate control can play in better aligning interests (Spear et al., 2007), while in the non-profit sector, the attention has been largely on accountability and, more recently, participation (as discussed in the previous section).

Governance is argued to be an especially relevant concept for social enterprises as these organizations "often must balance both financial and social returns, coordinate among multiple stakeholder groups and consequentially navigate complex trade-offs" (Achleitner et al., 2012). Achleitner et al. (2012) provide a useful table (Table 1 below) that maps the key characteristics of social enterprises and the corresponding governance issues that arise.

Table 1.

SE pursue a double bottom line	SE are exposed to trade-off decisions and need multiple areas of expertise Governance is a mechanism to safeguard the mission and to provide multiple perspectives as well as areas of expertise
SE have specific personalities	SE often start their business by having a dream and a mentality of just doing things Governance helps to improve organizational structure and to reach long-term sustainability
SE think outside the box and act in between markets	SE attract stakeholders from various sectors and often have hybrid legal structures that are highly dependent on external financing Governance facilitates the inclusion of stakeholders (e.g. investors) and provides legal support
SE address market niches and mostly offer services	Open source mechanisms seem promising to scale approaches of SE Governance helps to spread and approach while protecting the value proposition

A. Common Governance Theories and their Relevance to Social Enterprises

Established governance mechanisms in the social enterprise sector include “governing boards, monitoring systems, and signaling mechanisms like reporting or codes of conduct” (Achleitner et al., 2012). The difficulty in assessing social impact coupled with weak external monitoring make boards the most appropriate and relevant governance tool for social enterprises. Boards facilitate “dynamic interaction of management and stakeholders of an organization” (Ebrahim, 2003) and are “able to pursue monitoring as well as signaling functions” (Achleitner et al., 2012).

The main theories that explain the need for boards (primarily developed with respect to the private sector) are: principal-agent theory (the role of the board is primarily to address conflicts of interest through supervision), stewardship theory (the board acts as partner to management), stakeholder theory (the board ensures representation of not just owners or shareholders but all interested parties including beneficiaries), resource dependency theory (the members of the board lend their network, resources, perspectives) and the managerial hegemony theory (the board is merely symbolic with the management controlling the main levers of power) (Spear et al., 2007) . In general, with for-profit companies, where the business objective is maximizing value to shareholders, the board and the management are expected to work in tandem, with the board acting as representatives of the shareholders (Low, 2006). This would correspond to the stewardship model of governance.

1. Community-owned Model

   Pearce (2003) notes that non-profit organizations are "owned by the community rather than by shareholders" and Dun and Riley (2004) point out that these organizations have assets "that are held in trust and so are locked-in for community benefit". The interests of not just shareholders (owners) but also other stakeholders, such as the beneficiaries, will therefore have to be considered. The stewardship model of governance, as a result, makes way for a more democratic system in the case of non-profits, where performance is not just assessed from the top (by shareholders) but "also from below by stakeholders at large".

2. Stewardship Model

   However, in the case of social enterprises, which aim to be commercially sustainable, and to maximize their assets and resources, the democratic model might be of little use (Low, 2006). Instead, the social enterprise "moves away from the inclusive representation at Board level of a range of key stakeholders regardless of their strategic instrumentality, towards a skills-set that can more effectively manage the entire operation" (Mason and Royce, 2007). The stewardship model of governance would appear the pragmatic choice as "it offers bounded acceptance of some of the premises of stakeholder theory (trust and inclusion), whilst recognizing importance for rationality and value-production" (Mason and Royce, 2007). Further, as social enterprises attract private capital, the stewardship model will become increasingly essential as "a signal to investors about the effectiveness of asset management within these organizations" (Low, 2006). Low (2006) summarizes: "(i) Social enterprises boards are more likely to exhibit a stewardship model of governance than the democratic model found in other non-profits and; (ii) In order to enact the stewardship model, social enterprise boards are more likely to recruit members on the basis of expertise rather than representative status".

B. The Role of the Board

The role and composition of the board is likely to evolve with the lifecycle of the social enterprise (Achleitner et al., 2012). Initially, it may be filled with family and friends and then followed by investors and directors with specific operational or managerial expertise. Representatives from government and academia could also be inducted as the enterprise matures. The structure of the board is also likely to reflect the scale and complexity of the operations (Achleitner et al., 2012). An organization that is present across several geographies might feel the necessity to institute local boards to facilitate better management and also be more contextually relevant. The simplest structure is the single board or one-tier structure, found in the UK and USA, and comprises a single supervisory board constituted to oversee management. A two-tier structure seen in countries like Germany and The Netherlands requires the set up of a separate management board or executive committee that manages the day-to-day affairs of the company in addition to the supervisory board (Achleitner et al., 2012).

The hesitation to set up boards in social enterprises will resonate with private sector firms. The common fear is of "excessive control or pressure to justify every single decision" (Achleitner et al., 2012). The challenges faced by social enterprises in setting up governance mechanisms such as boards are not homogenous however as "origins and paths of development of social enterprise can also have an important impact both on the way governance structures are constructed and developed, and on the types of issues and challenges that they face" (Spear et al., 2009). Spear et al (2009), based on interviews and focus groups with governance advisers, board members and chief executives of social enterprises, find that mutual organizations like credit unions and cooperatives find it difficult to attract members with the required business skills and have a tendency to become managed by an elite group. Among trading charities, they note that board members are more comfortable "thinking in terms of projects and programmes" than with an entrepreneurial model that focuses on developing a sustainable business and evaluating new business opportunities and risks. The authors further find that board members "often lacked understanding of business models and were often risk averse". With public sector spin-offs like leisure trusts where private firms take over the running of formerly public services, the challenge for management is in "developing appropriate mechanisms to involve users" and for boards, with the "demands of operating in public service markets and managing contracting relationships with dominant funders". Finally, start-up social enterprises are similar to small businesses with entrepreneurs more involved in implementing their "business ideas and social mission than the broader issues of transparency and accountability". Governance was more a compulsion borne out of dealing with external investors or public service contractors.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations for Research on Governance in the Social Sector

In the final section of this document, we reflect on the gaps that remain in the research of governance in the social sector, both from the point of view of strengthening the capacity of research in this field and in terms of specific areas of research that merit attention.

Key Research Topics

1. Typology of Governance

How do governance structures and models differ across the private, government and not-for-profit sectors? What are the key characteristics of effect governance in each sector? How can best practice be transferred across sectors?

2. Hybrid Governance Models

How is governance enacted in hybrid organizations that sit across traditional sector boundaries and that enact multiple institutional logics and rationales of action?

3. Stages of Governance

Do organizations at different stages of development face different governance challenges?

4. Governance Measurement and Performance

How can good (or bad) governance be measured? Is longitudinal analysis possible? Is comparative analysis possible?

5. Governance Failures

How is governance failure defined and from whose perspective? What can be learnt by an analysis of governance failures? Are there common features driving failure?

6. Governance Contexts

How do cultural and regional factors influence perceptions of governance and how can appropriate models be developed for specific settings?

7. Governance and Legitimacy

How does governance relate to perceptions of organizational legitimacy and organizational sustainability and access to resources?

8. Governance and Regulation

What is the role of government policy and other regulatory structures in governance debates?

9. Stakeholder Integration

How can beneficiary voice and exit be integrated in governance models? How can multiple stakeholder interests be managed in governance hierarchies?

10. Teaching Good Governance

(How) Can good governance be taught?

11. Methodology

What are the most appropriate research methodologies for studying governance issues?

While these are some of the suggested areas of focus with respect to research and practice in the area of governance in the social sector, there are in fact already an increasing number of partnerships between social sector organizations and researchers in universities and think tanks. Indeed the interest in practitioner-relevant research within academic communities, which combines analytical rigor with the articulated research priorities of development organizations, has grown substantially.

By surveying the existing research in the field and reflecting on the gaps that remain, this review attempts to serve as a catalyst to research and practitioner discussions in this area.

References:

1. Achleitner, Ann-Kristi; Mayer, Judith; Schöning, Mirjam; Noble, Abigail; Heinecke Andreas (2012), Corporate Governance of Social Enterprises
2. Anderson, Kenneth, (2001), The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongovernmental Organisations
3. Barr, Abigail; Bategeka, Lawrence; Guloba, Madina; Kasirye, Ibrahim; Mugisha, Frederic; Serneels, Pieter; Zeitlin, Andrew (2011), When does community monitoring improve school performance? Improving Institutions for Pro-poor Growth (IIG)
4. Barr, Abigail; Fafchamps, Marcel; Owens, Trudy (2004), The Governance of Non-Governmental Organizations in Uganda
5. Besley, Timothy and Ghatak, Maithreesh (2007), Reforming Public Service Delivery
6. Charnovitz, Steve (2005), Accountability of Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) in Global Governance
7. Dunn, A. and Riley, C.A. (2004), Supporting the not-for-profit sector: The government's review of charitable and social enterprise
8. Ebrahim, A. (2003). Accountability in practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. World Development, 31(5), 813-829 as cited in Achleitner, Ann-Kristi; Mayer, Judith; Schöning, Mirjam; Noble, Abigail; Heinecke Andreas (2012), Corporate Governance of Social Enterprises
9. Edwards, Michael, (2000), NGO Rights and Responsibilities
10. Eisenberg, P., (2000), Why Charities Think They Can Regulate Themselves
11. Fowler, A, (1995), Assessing NGO Performance: Difficulties, Dilemmas and a Way Ahead
12. Grant, W Ruth and Keohane, O Robert, (2005), Accountability and Abuses in World Politics
13. Hansmann, Henry, (1987), Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organisations
14. Johns, Gary, (2000), NGO Way to Go. Political Accountability of Non-government Organisations in a Democratic Society
15. Kauffman, Daniel and Kraay, Aart (2008), Governance Indicators: Where are we, Where should we be going? Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK
16. Low, Chris (2006), A framework for the governance of social enterprise
17. Mas, Ignacio (March 2012), A Perfect Storm for Social Enterprises?, World Bank Blog

18. Mason, Chris and Royce, Maureen (2007), Fit for Purpose – Board Development for Social Enterprise
19. Moore, Mick and Stewart, Sheelagh, (1998), Corporate governance for NGOs?
20. New York Times, (2003), Holding Civic Groups Accountable
21. Pearce, J. (2003), Social Enterprise in Anytown as cited in Low, Chris (2006), A framework for the governance of social enterprise
22. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1986), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions
23. Salamon, L. (1995). The Global Associational Revolution: The Rise of the Third Sector on the World Scene
24. Spear, Roger; Cornforth, Chris and Aiken, Michael (2007), Governance and Social Enterprise, SER Conference at Southbank University
25. Spiro, J Peter, (2002) Accounting for NGOs, as cited in Charnovitz, Steve, (2005), Accountability of Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) in Global Governance
26. The Future of Charities and the Voluntary Sector as cited in Charnovitz, Steve (2005), Accountability of Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) in Global Governance
27. The New York Times, (2003), Holding Civic Groups Accountable
28. Wapner, Paul, (2002), Defending Accountability in NGOs, 2002 as cited in Charnovitz, Steve, (2005), Accountability of Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) in Global Governance